Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Nathan Seamons v. Larry D. Anderson et al : Brief
of Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Seamons
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
L. Delos Daines; Newel G. Daines; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Seamons v. Andersen, No. 7691 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1515

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7691
IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving
partner of SEAl\lONS & LOVELAND,
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ANDERSON and HANS P.
ANDERSON,
Defendants and Appellants,
and RICHARD PETERSEN,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
Ct·oss-Claimant, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and RAY
BITTERS, Co-Partners, doing business
in the firm name and style of VALLEY
CAR MARKET,
Defendants and Cross-Appellants

BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF
AND CROSSAPPELLANT
SEAMONS
CASE NO.

7691

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial Di,strict
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache
HON. LEWIS JONES, JUDGE
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VELOS DAINES,
inental Bank Building,
Lake City, Utah
OCT 2 2 1951 NEWEL G. DAINES,
Ciiche Valley Bank Building,
------~---------------------------Clerk, Supt'eme Court, :. ·!Lo.gan, Utah
A ttorneys'for Plaintiff and
Cross-Appellant, Seamons
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p~ease

add ,, -(T.R~~"2.S)) H~ --
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page 7, last line., atter words, "title ·:rrom Petersen.", please
v add "(T.R. 128-9) (T.R. 14.3-5) 1*.

/
/

/

On

S. on page 8 atter paragraph 1 1 after the words, "conclusion of law

taUs.", please insert ••(T.R. 2, 15,

I6, 341 91, 143-145)".

On page 8 at.t$r second complete paragraph, attar words, "Petersen's
agent. "• please inaert •(T.R. 1.28, 129, 131)"•

6.

7.

On page 9 at the end

or

the first complete paragraph after words,
"the defendants Andersona,u, plea·•• inaer\ "('l'·R· 2, 15 and 16)".

8. On page 10 at· the end of the first paragraph after the word, "case.",
/please insert u(f.R. 249, 250, 274, 275)"•
9. On page ll at the end of the first paragraph following the word,
./ "A.nd·ersons.'*·, please insert tt(T.R. 62, 19, 80, 87, 114) ''.
10.

on page 11 at the

end of the second complete paragraph after the

word, "contract.", please inaert n(T •.R. 166, 167)"•

v&r-t
L.DD:CJC

truly

yours,

1. ·nelos llainea
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND,
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ANDERSON and HANS P.
ANDERSON,
Defendants and Appellants,
and RICHARD PETERSEN,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
Cross-Claimant, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and RAY
BITTERS, Co-Partners, doing business
in the firm name and style of VALLEY
CAR MARKET,
Defendants and Cross-Appellants

BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF
AND CROSSAPPELLANT
SEAMONS
CASE NO.

7691

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-APPELLANT·
SEAMONS

STATE:\IENT OF FACTS
To avoid repetition, plaintiff and. cross-appellant
Nea1nons (hereinafter designated "plaintiff") substan- ,
tinily adopts and makes his own the statement of facts
eontained in the brief of cross-appellants Clayton E ..
Nielsen and Ray Bitters as set forth in pages 2 to .6 inC'lHNivP of their hrief, except plaintiff asserts that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·]nstrurnent Pxecuted by defendants Andersons and plaintiff \Vhich was in forn1 a conditional sales contract (plaintiff's Exhibit 1) was, in effect, a chattel mortgage.
Plaintiff after demand and refusal of payn1ent rnade
upon the Andersons under the above instrun1ent, pos~essed t~e car, at which ti~e the titlr.f.l~r1l3 \vas put

1n plant1ff's hands by the -\alley ~larket=1 Shortly thereafter defendant Petersen \vrongfully took the title from
plaintiff's desk in plaintiff's office in Logan \Vithout
plaintiff's kno\vledge or consent (T.R. 252-253) and
thereafter refused to return said title to plaintiff, although repeated efforts were n1ade to get Petersen to do
so. (
~ J 7/J/ ~.2.-J )

:r.

l . . pon the Andersons' failure to rnake payments (T.
R. 198), plaintiff was legally obligated to pay and did pay
to Comrnercial Credit Cornpany $1517.00. (T.R. 127)
Plaintiff asserts that he had no kno\vledge of an~·
agreernent \vhereby Petersen \vas to deliver title to the
~ll:}rcury conditionally.

PoiN-t 1.

That the trial court erred 1n conclusion
of lawt(~. 10~ et seq.) by holding, in effect, that plaintiff
by retention of the I\Iercury after repossession and hy
operating the I\1ercury approxirnately 7,000 rniles had
\vaived his right to· a personal judgrnent against any
party.
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~\RGf'"~IENT-

POINT I .

. A.gainst this conclusion of law plaintiff argues:
(a) That the conclusion that plaintiff waived his
right to a personal judg1nent against any of the parties
i~ contrary to the la'v and evidence.
The instrun1ent upon which plaintiff sued ·(Plain~
tiff's Exhibit 1) 'Yas, in effect, a chattel mortgage executed by defendants Andersons to plaintiff. The instrtmlen t could not be a conditional sales con tract because plaintiff had no title· to reserve at the time instrulnent 'vas executed 'vhich reserved title IS essential to
a conditional sales contract.
"\Vhere the purpose and effect of a transaction is to
create a lien on specific personalty as security for the
paJinent of a debt, there is a "mortgage" irrespective
of the language used. Teeter v. Good Hope Corp., 93 P.
:2rl 11 ~' 14 Cal. 2d 196.
The elements of a chattel mortgage are present in
the facts of this case. The intent of defendants Andersons to give plain tiff a lien is evidenced by the terms
of the instrument giving plaintiff right to repossess the
!1rreury upon default, power to sell, etc. Plaintiff con-

tends (Point II) that title passed to the Andersons under
the executed sales agreen1ent between Valley Market
and the Andersons (defendant Petersen's Exhibit 1). If
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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title passed to Andersons, clearly, as owners, they had a
n1ortgageable interest.
Even a buyer under a conditional sales contract
1nay mortgage the property 'vhich he has purchased
but not paid for. 14 CJS 617.
Under UCA 13-0-6 a Inortgagee may foreclose his
mortgage upon chattels by an action in equity, or may
advertise ·and sell the n1ortgaged property at public
auction 'vhere power to sell is given in mortgage. In this
case the plaintiff sought to foreclose. He was forced
to so elect due to the conversion of title by Petersen.
The instrun1ent executed by defendants Andersons to
plain'tiff provided for a deficiency judgment in case the
sale of the l\[ercury did not bring sufficient to satisfy
the judgment. Thus plaintiff contends 'he has a right
to a personal judg1nent against defendants Andersons
for this deficiency and/ or a personal judgnlent against
Richard Petersen for conversion of title, (Point Ic)
which conversion n1ade a resale i1npossible to the danlage of the plaintiff and which prevented plaintiff fron1
1nini1nizing damages by selling the car. Plaintiff

\VH~

legally obligated to pay and did pay to Connnercial
Credit Co1npany $1,517.00 due to the Andersons' default.
The ·.deficiency bet~veen this an1ount and the $950.00
brought ~or the Mercury under court sale is $567.00 for
which the . plaintiff contends he should .have judgn1ent
against the Andersons.
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J[ortgagee is entitled to retain a sun1 sufficient to
repay all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred
by hi1n in foreclosing the n1ortgage, even though not
stipulated in the mortgage. 14 CJS 1087. Therefore,
plaintiff should be allo,ved his costs.
~lortgagee

n1ay also have attorney's fee where mortgage tern1s provided for san1e and where the ·fee is
reasonable. 14 CJS 1088. The instrument in suit provided for attorney's fee and evidence was given at the
trial that $200.00 was a reasonable fee for foreclosure of
a chattel mortgage.
(b) That the holding plaintiff oper~ted car approxinlately 7,000 miles is unsupported by th~ evidence.
The evidence of Petersen was that the car had been ·
operated approxin1ately 9,000 miles 'vhen he turned it
over to the \Talley l\Iarket for sale. The evidence of both
Petersen and Larry Anderson 'vas that they observed
the speedometer shortly after the time plaintiff possessed the }[ercury anil~at th~ speedometer read apt. '3": . .::LK.J)
proxi1nately 17,000 miles~ he ev1dence indicates that the
rar 'vas in the physical possession of the Andersons and
the valley l\1arket c·ompany for practically the entire
period between the times these readings were made and
consequently the n1ileage must be chargeable to the parties in possession during that period. The plaintiff's
testin1ony was that he ran the car approxi~ately 600
to 800 1niles in attempting to resell it and inattemnting
c :r.~ 1.2-j>-9) t. ...~ 1'1:...1- s J
to rerov0r th~ title from PeterRen. Thus, the conclusion
..-'\
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iR not supported hy the evidence and the 'vaiver found
against the plaintiff under this conclusion of law fails.
l 3': ~ :L. 1 .' ~ 1~J1 ~ t q11 I '19 - Ill.6)
(e) That retention of the Mercury bet\veen times of
repossession and the ti1ne of filing suit was excused by
Petersen's conversion of title making a sale impossible
to the plain tiff's dan1age.
After default of Andersons and demand and refusal 1uade upon the1n, plain tiff possessed the car under
the ter1ns of the chattel n1ortgage. Title was delivered
to plaintiff by \Talley ~Iarket, Petersen's agent. l J. J~f)
I~ ,,1~1).

r,

· A 1nortgagee entitled to possession of personal property covered by his mortgage may ·Inaintain an action
against the third party 'vho has converted sa1ne without
first obtaining a judgment against the mortgagor and
'vithout making hi1n a party to the suit. Ho'ward v. First
National Bank of I-Intchison, 44 l{an. 549, 24 Pac. 983.
·A 1uortgagee has such interest after breach of condition as to entitle hin1 to 1naintain trover for a conversion of the chattels n1ortgaged. First N a tiona! Bank
r. Sin1an, G5 S. DalL 514, 275 N.vV. 347.
The cases indicate a 1nortgagee has a sufficient
interes.t. in the n1ortgaged property to sue a converter.
Petersen's taking of title 'vas unlawful in that title had
passed to Andersons and the plaintiff as 1nortgagee had,
through Andersons' default, succeeded to Anderson~'
interest in tltP property. This conversion 1nade a sale
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the ~Iercury by plaintiff 'vithout physical evidence·
of title impossible. Plaintiff 'va.s drunaged in that at
the ti1ne of possession, August 15, 1949, the car was
'vorth, according to the advisory verdict of the jury 'vhich
the court adopted $1700.00. The car brought $950.00 when
sold under court order. This amount of depreciation
'vas caused by the conversion of title 'vhich prevented
a sale by the plaintiff over a period during which the
value of the ~[ercury diminished.
The plaintiff is not only entitled to deficiency judgment against the defendants Andersons as aforesaid
but is entitled to a judgment against the defendant Petersen in the sun1 of $750.00 for the conversion, conditioned
upon the plaintiff's being unable to collect the deficiency
judgn1ent against the defendants Andersons. { J. ~ .2,~ /5 '1- I~
POINT II
That the trial court erred in finding of fact 3 ( R.
108 et. seq.) in finding, in effect, that Richard Petersen
"is now" and was the owner of the Mercury and entitled to possession or payinent.
ARGUMENT
Attention is called to the executed contract as discussed in statement of facts in the brief of defendants
Nielsen and Bitters. The contract tern1s were set forth
in defendant Petersen's Exhibit 1 and no mention is.
n1ade therein of any reserved title in Petersen. PeterHen's authorized agent to sell, 'Talley Market, made the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contract and Petersen assented to its tern1s. Strictly,
the ter1ns of statute UCA 57 -3a-72 were not cornplied
\vith in that no registration and title were issued
by the Motor Vehicle Departn1ent to Andersons.
1-Iovvever, there is evidence to the effect that Petersen
signed the title before a notary, ~fr. Bitters, who 'vas
Petersen's agent to sell, and that said agent neglected
to notarize the title. Petersen hi1nself testified that he
turned the title over to \'"alley l\farket for the purpose·
of registration and licensl.ng in favor of Andersons which
vvould involve issuance of a new title. 'l.,he proceedings
had so far progressed towards placing the title in Ander~ons that on the basis of an executed contract Andersons at any tin1e before their failure to pay could havr
legally forced Pet~rsen to transfer title so that registration and a new title would have issued to Anderson~.
By n1ajority opinion in Jackson v. Ja1nes, 97 Utah 41, the
TT tah Supreu1e. Court held that a completed gift of a
vehicle 'vas operative to transfer title to a ear despite the
'vords of TiC A. 57 -3a-72. The holding vva.s that con1pliancr
'vith the statute vvas not 1nandatory to pass title in that
ease .. ( J. ~ ~ '19/ .2.5tJ" '-711, J.-75)
In the present case vvhere the contract 'vas executed
and only the forrnality of proper notarization remained,
together 'vith the forn1ality of issuance of new title nncl
registration hy the ~1otor \Tehicle Department, a fair consideration of the facts should place the title in the Andersons. Petersen and the \ 7 alley ~rarket kne'v of the
arrange1nent to finanee thP ~fercury through plaintiff
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and neeepted $1400.00 on the purchase price 'vhich
. .\ndersons procured under this arrange1nent. Petersen's
agent 'vas instrun1ental in securing this financing and
it "ras kno,vn to then1 that the chattel 1nortgage executed
to secure the obligation 'vas obtained by giving plaintiff a lien upon the ca.r as security. The plain tiff contends that this knowledge, actual or imputed, estops
Petersen from asserting that title did not pass to the
.A.ndersons. (_
~ tJ./ )~ tf4/ r~ 1/¥)

J.,.

POINT III
That the court erred in fin.d~ng of fact 5 (R. 108 et.
seq.) in holding, in effect, that plaintiff kne'v of an agreenlent between Petersen and Valley Market. whereby
Petersen was to retain title until paid.
ARGUMENT
There is no evidence in the record to support the
finding that plaintiff knew of such an ag-reement. The
evidence of plaintiff Sea1nons was that Loveland (SeaInons' deceased partner who was alive at the time the
instrument in suit, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was executed)
agreed to finance the car. The plaintiff believes that
the trial court 1nisconstrued the testimony of Seamons in
finding that he knew of an agreement for conditional
delivery of title by Petersen. Seamons testified that he
knew of conditions in the chattel mortgage which was in
for1n a conditional sales contrart. l J. f. /~~It, 7)
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V'l I IEl~EF·ORE, plaintiff respectfully suh1nits that

the trial court erred in failing to enter a deficiency judgInent against defendants Andersons in the a1nount of
$567.00, costs, attorney's fee in the an1ount of $200.00
and/ or erred in failing to enter a judginent against
defendant Petersen for conversion of title to the plaintiff's da1nage in the amount of $750.00.

L. DELOS DAINES,
Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
NEWEL G. DAINES,
Cache Valley Bank Building,
Logan, Utah
Attorneys for PLaintiff and
Cross-Appell-ant, Seamons
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